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I.

INTRODUCTION

Over one hundred fifty years ago, the French writer and observer Alexis
de Tocqueville noted that "there is hardly a political question in the United
States which does not sooner or later turn into a judicial one."' It is clear to

even the most casual observer of the American political system that the transformation phenomenon about which de Tocqueville wrote has grown exponentially since the time he first observed it. The first years of the twenty-first

century find judges embroiled in a host of highly important and controversial
issues such as abortion, prison reform, religious liberty, education reform, and
even determining the eventual victor in the 2000 presidential election. In addition, these judges regularly decide all sorts of more pedestrian issues, such as
divorce, child custody, and guilt or innocence in criminal cases, that may ultimately be far more important to citizens' lives than the landmark decisions
taught in universities and law schools.
In short, courts are important factors in the lives of all Americans and it is
no surprise that the methods used to select judges to these courts are highly
conflictual and intensely debated. The debate centers not only on the relative
competence of judges chosen under each system, but also on the basic tension
between judicial independence and public accountability.
At the federal level, the Founders clearly came down on the side of judicial independence by providing that Article III judges would serve indefinitely,
so long as they maintained "good behavior" (essentially life tenure), and by
enacting a prohibition on the diminution of salary while these judges held
office. 2 At the state level, however, most legislatures have opted for less judicial independence and more public accountability by requiring judges to stand
for periodic reappointment or periodic election of one type or another; Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island are the only states affording
judges life tenure.3 Although each state utilizes its own unique variation, there
are generally five basic forms of judicial selection in the states.
The least common system, used by only South Carolina and Virginia, is
legislative election of judges, which provides for the state legislature to choose
judges. Slightly more popular is gubernatorial appointment, which is practiced
in seven states, either with or without legislative consent. Partisan election,
*
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whereby judicial candidates compete in election campaigns under the banner of
their political party, can be found in eleven states. Nonpartisan elections and
the merit system, or "Missouri Plan", are equally popular methods of judicial
selection, with each found in twenty states.4 Nonpartisan elections, such as
those in Nevada, are competitive races in which candidate party affiliation, if
any, is not included on the ballot. The merit system, in contrast, is one in
which:
the governor appoints a judge from among several candidates recommended by a
nominating panel of five or more people, usually including attorneys (often chosen
by the local bar association), nonlawyers appointed by the governor, and sometimes a
senior local judge. Either by law or by implicit agreement, the governor appoints
someone from the recommended list. After serving for a short period of time, often a
year, the newly appointed judge must stand for a special election, at which time he or
she in effect runs on his or her record. (The voters are asked, "Shall Judge X be
retained in office?") If the judge's tenure is supported
by the voters ....
the judge
5
will serve for a regular and fairly long term.

Clearly the most popular form of judicial selection among the states is
competitive elections. Combining partisan and nonpartisan election states,
thirty-one states utilize one or other of these methods.6 Given the popularity of
elections for choosing judges, it is important to examine them more closely and
discuss whether public financing of elections would make such elections better.

II.

THE EFFICACY OF ELECTIONS AS A METHOD OF JUDICIAL SELECTION 7

Those states utilizing judicial elections have made an explicit policy
choice that the accountability of judges to the public outweighs any concomitant loss in judicial independence. Advocates of this position believe that, since
judges affect the lives of a state's citizens in significant ways, they are to be
held accountable in the same way as other policymakers. As political scientist
Harry P. Stumpf explains the rationale:
The familiar argument usually set forth in favor of electing judges is that (1) whereas
America purports to be a democracy, (2) whereas democracy is usually defined as a
governmental arrangement wherein policy-makers are held accountable to policy
recipients, (3) whereas judges are policy-making officials, and (4) whereas elections
are the usual method for ensuring or at least promoting political accountability, election is the preferred method of judicial selection, because such a system best assures
4 LAWRENCE BAUM, AMERICAN COURTS PROCESS AND POLICY
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accountability8 and, hence, is the most consistent with principles of democratic
government.

The empirical data suggest, however, that judicial elections do not, in fact,
achieve the goal of accountability. What these data do show is that (1) large
percentages of judges in election states are initially appointed, not elected to the
bench; (2) once there, judges are rarely challenged and even more rarely
defeated; and (3) voters tend to have low levels of information and low turnout
for such elections.
A.

Initial Accession to the Bench

Although the goal of judicial election systems is to ensure that judges
reach the bench by a democratic election process, it is not uncommon to find
large percentages of judges in these election states initially appointed to the
bench by the governor to fill a midterm vacancy. There are some notable
empirical studies on this topic. For example, analyzing the thirty-six states
utilizing judicial elections between 1948 and 1957, James Hemdon found that
fifty-six percent (56%) of those who became supreme court justices during that
decade had initially acceded to the bench through gubernatorial appointment to
fill a midterm vacancy. In three of these states all of the supreme court justices
during this period (i.e., 100%) were appointed by the governor.9 Furthermore,
examining state supreme courts in non-Southern states between 1948 and 1974,
Philip L. Dubois determined that fifty-three percent (53%) of these justices
were initially placed on the states' high courts by gubernatorial appointment to
fill a midterm vacancy.' 0
The pattern is similar for trial court judges as well. In one study, researchers found that in partisan election states, thirty percent (30%) of trial court
judges, and in nonpartisan election states, fifty-seven percent (57%) of trial
court judges, had been initially appointed by the governor." Additionally,
from 1864 until 1988, somewhat less than half of Nevada Supreme Court justices, forty-one percent (41%), had been appointed to the bench by the
governor. 12
B.

Judicial "Elections"

Those who favor judicial elections argue that it makes little difference that
judges in large numbers are appointed to the bench by the governor. What is
significant, and what makes them accountable, is the fact that they must run in
competitive elections where voters have the power to reelect them to, or
P. STUMPF, AMERICAN JUDICIAL POLITICS 147 (2d ed. 1998).
9 James Herndon, Appointment as a Means of Initial Accession to Elective State Courts of
Last Resort, 38 N.D. L. REV. 60, 64 (1962).
" See Stumpf, supra note 8, at 148 n.50 (citing PHILIP L. DUBOIS, FROM BALLOT TO
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remove them from, the bench. Once more, however, the data show a very
different picture. In fact, incumbent judges are rarely challenged and, in those
few cases in which they are, the incumbent is almost always victorious over his
or her challenger. Political scientist Henry Glick observes that:
Of the total number of judicial elections held in the fifty states, closely contested,
partisan "unjudicial" judicial elections probably constitute no more than five to seven
percent of the total. Figures from other research show that few judges are ever challenged, and almost never face a close, hard-fought campaign. Even after the election
13
is over, no matter how it was fought, the incumbent usually comes out the winner.
Once again, the empirical studies tell the tale. In their study of Texas
courts between 1940 and 1962, Bancroft Henderson and T.C. Sinclair found
that sixty-six percent (66%) of judges were appointed to the bench by the governor and ninety-six percent (96%) of them were re-elected in the first election
following their appointment; eighty-six percent (86%) failed to even draw a
challenger. 1 4 In a subsequent summary of various single-state studies, Lawrence Baum concluded that trial court judges in Ohio were challenged twentyseven percent (27%) of the time; in Michigan, twenty-six percent (26%) of the
time; and in California, only seven percent (7%) of the time. Of those few who
do face opposition, the incumbents "win most of the time." 5 In addition, a
fifty-state study of courts of last resort by Melinda Gann Hall found that,
between 1980 and 1995, state supreme court incumbents were challenged
44.2% of the time in nonpartisan election states and 61.1% of the time in partisan election states. 1 6 It should be noted, however, that because these data
include any challenger, regardless of viability, they tend to overestimate the
extent to which judicial incumbents face serious challenges.
Furthermore, in a study of Nevada courts between 1894 and 1984, I found
that only forty-two percent (42%) of Nevada's district court races were contested. At the state supreme court level, only fifty-eight percent (58%) of these
races were contested between 1864 and 1988. During that same time frame,
ninety-two percent (92%) of incumbent supreme court justices running for
reelection won; fifty-eight percent (58%) of these victorious incumbents failed
to draw even a single challenger.' 7 The last incumbent justice of the Nevada
Supreme Court to be defeated was Noel Manoukian in 1984.
If anything, these trends, at least in Nevada, have increased in the years
since the 1990 study was published. For example, in the 2002 elections, two
state supreme court seats were on the ballot. Only one of these races was contested. As one would expect based on the studies noted above, the incumbent,
William Maupin, easily defeated his challenger, Don Chairez, by a margin of
59% to 33%. The other seat was an open one that drew only one candidate,
Mark Gibbons.
13 Henry R. Glick, The Promise and the Performance of the Missouri Plan: Judicial Selection in the Fifty States, 32 U. MIAMI L. REV. 509, 519 (1978).
14 BANCROFT C. HENDERSON & T.C. SINCLAIR, THE SELECTION OF JUDGES IN TEXAS: AN
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As the 1990 study showed, competition for judicial seats in the inferior
courts is even less likely to occur; that pattern held true for the 2002 elections
as well. In Clark County (Las Vegas), twenty-one district court seats were on
the ballot; only eight (38%) were contested. Of these eight in which there was
a contest, half of them involved challenges to an incumbent. Out of the four
races in which an incumbent judge was challenged, three of the incumbents
(75%) easily defeated their opponents; only incumbent Jeffrey Sobel was
defeated, and only after an incredibly expensive campaign by his challenger,
Jackie Glass. Altogether, then, in 2002 seventeen incumbent district court
judges ran for reelection in Clark County, only four (23.5%) drew opponents,
and only one lost. Thus, the chances of loss for an incumbent district court
judge in Clark County in the 2002 election was one out of seventeen, or 5.9
percent (5.9%).18

Reasons given for the high reelection rates for incumbent judges vary.
Stumpf suggests that there is, within the legal profession, an "unwritten rule...
that once an attorney has given up his or her practice for the bench, that person
is to be treated with some deference." Potential challengers may also be frightened off by the fear of reprisals in later appearance before the judge, and by the
fact that incumbent judges have greater name recognition and a superior ability
to raise campaign funds.19
C.

Voter Information and Roll-Off

Although partisan judicial elections provide a party label for voters, nonpartisan elections do not. This lack of partisan cues raises the costs to the voter
of acquiring information about the candidates. In response, many choose simply not to vote in judicial races. Studies of nonpartisan elections have shown
that voters were more likely to have an opinion about a candidate if they were
given knowledge of his or her party affiliation. 20 In addition, nonpartisan elections not only reduce participation, but also increase the advantage of sitting
judges because the lack of a partisan label leads voters to use incumbency as
their cue for whom to vote. 2' Furthermore, separate studies by Christopher C.
Blunt and Monika L. McDermott concluded that low information level elections, such as judicial elections, cause voters to cue on the candidates' names,
ascribing a more liberal stereotype to women and minorities than to white
males.22 In turn, they cast their votes on this basis, with Democrats and liberals
11 Id. Family court judgeships in Clark County tend to be more competitive than the district
court with five of the six seats being contested; only incumbent Art Richie avoided a race.
Of these five contested seats, four featured incumbents; all were reelected. Thus, even
though family court judgeships were more likely to result in a contested race, incumbents
were still victorious in every single race in which they sought reelection. Two Clark County
justices of the peace were on the ballot for reelection as well; neither drew an opponent.
19 See Stumpf, supra note 8, at 148-49.
20 Peverill Squire & Eric R.A.N. Smith, The Effect of Partisan Information on Voters in
Nonpartisan Elections, 50 J. OF POL. 169 (1988).
21 Brian F. Schaffner et al., Teams Without Uniforms: The NonpartisanBallot in State and
Local Elections, 54 POL. RES. Q. 7, 8 (March 2001).
22 See Christopher C. Blunt, Can Voters Judge? Voting Behavior at the Extreme of Low
Information (paper presented at the 1999 annual meeting of the Western Political Science
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more likely than Republicans and conservatives to vote for candidates who are
easily identifiable by name as women and minorities.
Judicial elections of any type tend to be low-key. In part this is a result of
a lack of issues allowed in judicial campaigns under the American Bar Association's Model Code of Judicial Conduct. Canon 5 of the Code, for example,
prohibits "statements that commit or appear to commit the candidate with
respect to cases, controversies or issues that are likely to come before the court
",23

The consequences of this lack of available issues in judicial campaigns are
two-fold. On the one hand, a lack of issues may lead candidates to engage in
personal attacks and negative campaigns in order to diminish their opponent's
support while bolstering their own. On the other hand, the lack of issues means
that voters are hard-pressed to distinguish between the candidates. As a result,
voters, who are often unwilling to engage in the difficult and time consuming
work necessary to be fully informed about the differences between the candidates, simply choose in large numbers not to vote in judicial races. The difference between the number of voters participating in top ballot races, such as for
president and governor, and the number voting in judicial races is referred to as
"roll-off." These roll-off rates tend to be quite dramatic.
For example, in his studies, Allen T. Klots found a roll-off rate of between
twelve percent (12%) and twenty-five percent (25%). Frighteningly, he discovered that, of those who voted in the judicial races, only thirty percent (30%) of
them could remember the name of even one candidate for whom they had
voted. 24 Lawrence Baum found a roll-off rate in Ohio judicial elections at
around twenty percent (20%). Similar to Klots's research, he also found that
many of those who voted in a state supreme court race could not remember for
whom they had voted, or in some cases, whether they had voted or not. As
Baum charitably notes, "[miost of those voters probably had little basis for
their choices." 2 5
These trends hold true in Nevada as well. For example, in the 2002 election for state supreme court between Maupin and Chairez, the two contenders
had a combined total of 360,216 votes. In the gubernatorial race at the top of
the ticket, however, 464,894 people voted, representing a roll-off of approxi-

Association, Seattle, Washington) (on file with author); Monika L. McDermott, Race and
Gender Cues in Low-Information Elections, 51 POL. RES. Q. 895 (December 1998).
Canon 5A(3)(d)(ii) (1990). It is possible that state judicial races will become more issue oriented as a result of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision
in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 535 U.S. 765 (2002), in which the Court held
that the Minnesota Supreme Court's canon of judicial conduct prohibiting candidates for
judicial election from announcing their views on disputed legal or political issues violated
the First Amendment. The effects of this decision in Nevada may be even greater, given that
the state supreme court recently issued rules allowing judicial candidates in nonpartisan
races to disclose their party affiliation.
24 Allen T. Klots, The Selection of Judges and the Short Ballot, 38 J. AM. JUDICATURE
Soc'y 134, 136 (1955).
25 Lawrence Baum, Electing Judges, in CONTEMPLATING COURTS 21 (Lee Epstein ed.,
1995).
23 MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT
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mately twenty-three percent (23%).26 At the district court level, the roll-off
may reach even higher.
What, therefore, are we to conclude from this wealth of data? What we
know, based on decades of empirical research, is that large numbers of judges
in elective states initially arrive on the bench through gubernatorial appointment, that once on the bench they rarely draw challengers and are even more
rarely defeated, and that voters in large numbers choose not to vote in judicial
elections or, worse, vote blindly. It is, therefore, quite difficult to conclude that
elections achieve the accountability that their proponents suggest. At most,
judicial elections merely allow public "control over the broad outlines of judicial policy[.]" 2 7 That judicial elections fail to hold judges accountable is not
the end of the matter, however. They also raise serious questions of conflicts of
interest in the pursuit of campaign contributions.
D.

Campaign Contributions and Conflicts of Interest

Although judicial campaigns frequently lack issues, one thing that is not
lacking, at least in those campaigns in which there is a contest, is a need for
funding often reaching into the hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of dollars. Candidates, consequently, must either be wealthy enough to finance their
campaign or must solicit others for contributions. Unfortunately, those most
likely to give to judicial candidates are also those most likely to appear in the
judge's court: attorneys, developers, insurance companies, and, in Nevada,
gaming corporations. Solicitation of, and contributions by, those who are likely
to appear before the successful judicial candidate creates, at best, the perception
of a conflict of interest and, at worst, a true conflict. A Texas study found that
175 out of 246 attorneys responding to a survey disagreed with the statement
that "[p]olitical campaign contributions do not affect a judge's decision-making."2 8 Similarly, a study commissioned by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
"found that nine out of ten voters believed that judicial decisions were influenced by large campaign contributions. '"29
Perceptions of a conflict of interest are widespread. However, links
between campaign contributions and judges' decisions have been less common,
but nonetheless extant. There have been several studies in this area. For example, an analysis by the Philadelphia Inquirer into that city's municipal and
common pleas courts found that "defense lawyers who had either worked in or
26 The combined votes for Maupin and Chairez do not include those who voted for "None

of the Above" (NOTA) while the tally of gubernatorial race votes does. This is neither
misleading nor inappropriate given the purpose is to determine how many people in the state
voted compared to how many voted for a supreme court candidate. It is likely that many of
those voting for NOTA in the supreme court race did so because they knew so little about
the candidates, not because they disliked them.
27 PHILIP L. DUBOIS, FROM BALLOT TO BENCH: JUDICIAL ELECTIONS AND THE QUEST FOR
ACCOUNTABILITY 239 (1980).
28 Donald W. Jackson & James W. Riddlesperger, Jr., Financing Partisan Campaignsfor
Judicial Office: The 1988 Election of the Chief Justice of the Texas Supreme Court (paper
presented at the 1990 annual meeting of the Western Political Science Association, Newport
Beach, California) (on file with author).
29 Charles Gardner Geyh, National Summit on Improving Judicial Selection: Publicly
Financed Judicial Elections: An Overview, 34 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1467, 1470 (June 2001).
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contributed money to judges' campaigns won 71 percent (71%) of their cases
before those judges. Yet in the same municipal courts, an average of only 35
percent (35%) of the defendants won their cases."' 30 A survey commissioned
by the Texas State Bar found that "30 percent (30%) of judges said they knew
colleagues who assigned counsel because they contributed to their judicial election campaigns.'
Additionally, an analysis of election campaigns for the
Texas Supreme Court between 1994 and 1998 found that the justices were
"four times more likely to accept an appeal filed by a campaign contributor"
and that "the more money that a petitioner contributed to the justices the more
likely that they were to accept a given petition. '"32
Furthermore, a study of arbitration law in the Alabama Supreme Court
found "a strong correlation between a justice's source of campaign funds and
how that justice votes in arbitration cases."3 3 The study concluded that even

"seemingly bland questions of contract formation, interpretation, and waiver
are apparently battlegrounds between the interest groups. Arbitration law in

Alabama seems to ... have no doctrinal integrity that survives the vicissitudes
34

of the interest group battle.",
Although it is true that "correlation does not prove causation" 35 and that
"true correlations may have perfectly innocuous explanations,"3 6 such correlations do certainly give rise to the concern that justice is being bought in state
courts. At the very least, it raises perceptions of conflict of interest and judicial
vote-buying that can be as seriously damaging to the prestige and legitimacy of
the courts as if they were proven true. Based upon the studies noted above, this
perception is held not only by the public but by attorneys and judges alike.
Finally, the cost of elections and the necessity to solicit contributions from
prospective litigants may have consequences beyond the creation of a perceived
conflict of interest. It is likely that they may serve to discourage competent and
highly ethical individuals from running for judicial positions. Not only is the
amount needed to run a campaign often staggering, but many might find the
notion of soliciting potential litigants and their attorneys for contributions to be
ethically distasteful. Although no definitive data exist on this issue, it is arguable that these concerns drive away from the bench those who would make fine,
competent judges.
III.

ALTERNATIVES TO COMPETITIVE JUDICIAL ELECTIONS

Given that elections do not achieve their stated goal of judicial accountability, and that they have the added disadvantages of conflicts of interest and
campaign financing, it has been suggested that they be replaced in Nevada with
30 STUMPF & CULVER, supra note

3, at 44.

31 Amy Bach, Justice on the Cheap, THE NATION 25, 27 (May 21, 2001).
32 TEXANS FOR PUBLIC JUSTICE, PAY TO PLAY: How BIG MONEY BuYs ACCESS TO THE
TEXAS SUPREME COURT 1 (2001).
33 Stephen J. Ware, Money, Politics, and Judicial Decisions: A Case Study of Arbitration

Law in Alabama, 15 J.L. & POL. 645, 661 (1999).
34 Id. at 685.
35 Id. at 661.
36

See Geyh, supra note 29, at 1470.
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some other system such as the Missouri Plan. Proposals to do so appeared on
the state's general election ballot in 1972 and 1988; both were easily defeated.
In part, this may be due to the fact that the merit system, like elections,
also does not achieve its stated goals. As I have noted elsewhere37 the merit
system does not, as proponents argue, take "politics" out of the selection process. Instead, it merely transforms the overt politics of election systems into
what has been referred to as a "subterranean" process of bar and bench politics.38 Rather than open, public campaigning, the politics of judicial selection in
merit-system states occur behind closed doors, in the selection of commission
members and the panel of names ultimately sent to the governor. Likewise, the
merit system does not result in better judges. A veritable multitude of studies
on the topic all reach the same conclusion: "[n]ot only is there little evidence of
the superiority of judges selected by the 'merit' system, .

.

. but also there is

little to show that judicial selection mechanisms make any difference at all."3 9
And finally, use of the merit system does not necessarily balance accountability
and independence. Noncompetitive retention elections rarely result in an
incumbent's ouster (thus lacking accountability) and are, at least on occasion, a
battleground for political parties and interest groups to target judges with whom
they disagree on a particular issue (thus lacking independence). 4 °
It is also the case that various factors more specific to the Nevada political
culture weigh against adoption of the merit system.4 1 First, voters and key
lawmakers perceive no major problems with the system (e.g., no state judges
have been convicted or even accused of bribery or vote selling) and are, thus,
less than motivated to change the current electoral process. Second, Nevada
voters, urged on by Las Vegas's two major daily newspapers, are adamant that
they want judges held accountable, and they perceive competitive elections as
the most efficacious way of doing so. And third, the groups most likely to
finance and support a campaign for adoption of the merit system are lawyers
and judges. Given that lawyers are generally not held in high regard by the
public, and judges would be seen as attempting to avoid their rightful judgment
by the voters, it is unlikely that an organized movement will occur. Certainly,
in the 1972 and 1988 elections, there was no organized bench and bar campaign
to adopt merit selection, even though a survey in the 1980s found overwhelming support for it among the legal class.4 2
37 See Bowers, supra note 7, at 10-14.
38 RICHARD

A.

WATSON

& RONDAL G.

DOWNING, THE POLITICS OF THE BENCH AND BAR:

4 (1969).
39 See Stumpf, supra note 8, at 143.
40 See, e.g., Traciel V. Reid, The Politicization of Retention Elections: Lessons from the
JUDICIAL SELECTION UNDER THE MISSOURI NONPARTISAN COURT PLAN

Defeat of Justices Lanphier and White, 83 JUDICATURE 68 (1999) (the cases of Penny White
and David Lanphier); John T. Wold & John H. Culver, The Defeat of the CaliforniaJustices:
The Campaign, the Electorate, and the Issue of JudicialAccountability, 70 JUDICATURE 348
(1987) (the case of Rose Bird and her colleagues on the California Supreme Court); and R.
Darcy, The New Era of Oklahoma Judicial Elections (paper presented at the 1999 Summer
Judicial Conference, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma) (on file with author).
41 For a full discussion of these factors, see Michael W. Bowers, Judicial Selection in
Nevada: A Modest Proposal for Reform, 43 NEV. HIST. SOC'Y Q. 100, 101-02 (Spring
2000).
42 See Michael W. Bowers, Judicial Selection in Nevada: Choosing the Judges, 11
HALYCON:

A
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85, 100-101 (1989).
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Since the 1988 election loss, there has been no serious attempt to replace
Nevada's current system of judicial elections with the merit system. Consequently, if any reform is to be wrought in the state's method of selecting
judges, it is clear that it must occur within the current framework of nonpartisan
elections.
IV.

PUBLIC FINANCING OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS

If one assumes the continued practice of judicial elections in Nevada, one
possible alternative for reform is to eliminate the source of, and perceptions of,
conflicts of interest by replacing private fundraising with publicly financed
campaigns. Although public financing legislation has been introduced in over
twenty states,43 only two have such a system. Since 1977, Wisconsin has had
partial public financing for supreme court candidates, and, in 2002, North Carolina passed the Judicial Campaign Reform Act to provide full public financing
for all appellate court candidates beginning in 2004."
The primary advantage of a public financing system is that the more
money judges receive from public sources, the less they will have to raise from
private groups and individuals who are interested in the outcome of cases the
judges decide. Thus, public funding reduces the potential for campaign contributions to influence judicial behavior and addresses the public perception that
such influence occurs.4 5
The necessity to remove such perceptions is particularly acute among
judges. Unlike legislators or executive branch officials, their role is to act as
neutral arbiters of the law and not simply representatives of the majority of
voters or their campaign contributors. Because candidates who might otherwise be deterred from running might do so, it is also possible that public
financing would increase competitiveness in judicial elections and make them a
greater tool for accountability.
At the same time, however, there are practical problems in implementing
such a system.46 Implementation of such a system would require that several
questions be addressed:
" Which races should be publicly funded (e.g., Supreme Court, District
Court, Justice Court, Municipal Court)? Should funding apply to general elections only or to primary elections as well?
" How much public funding should be provided (i.e., full or partial
funding)?
" Which candidates should be eligible to receive public funds (e.g., how
does the state define "serious" candidates)?
* What conditions should be imposed on the candidates for funding?
" How can excessive spending by or on behalf of a publicly funded candidate's opponent be addressed?
4 See Geyh, supra note 29, at 1467.
44 American Judicature Society, North CarolinaAdopts Public Financingfor Judicial Elections (2003), available at http://www.ajs.org/selection/sel-pubfin.asp (last visited Aug. 19,
2003).
41 See Geyh, supra note 29, at 1471.
46 Id. at 1473-1475.
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" How should these public funds be disbursed?
" How should revenue to fund this system be generated?
• Who in the state should administer this program?
As Table 1 indicates, Wisconsin and North Carolina have answered these
questions in somewhat different ways:
TABLE 1: PUBLIC FINANCING OF JUDICIAL CAMPAIGNS:
47
WISCONSIN AND NORTH CAROLINA

ISSUE OF CONCERN
Applicable Races

WISCONSIN
Supreme Court

NORTH CAROLINA
Supreme Court & Intermediate Appellate Courts

Funding Amounts

Partial funding of
$97,031 out of total
$215,625 that may be
spent

Full funding of $200,000
for supreme court and
$140,000 for intermediate appellate court

Eligibility

Must raise $11,000 in
increments of no more
than $100

Must raise $33,000 in
increments of no more
than $500 from at least
350 individuals

Conditions Imposed on
Recipients

Must agree to spending
contribution limits

Can spend no more than
$69,000 in primary;
spend only public money
in general election plus
leftover from primary

Remediation for Excessive Spending by
Opponent

Candidates opposed by
those not accepting public funds not bound by
spending and contribution limits

Candidates opposed by
those not accepting public funds receive "rescue
funds" up to twice original amount

Generation of Revenue

$1 check-off on state tax
return

$3 check-off on state tax
return and optional contributions of $50 by
attorneys paying annual
license fee

Given that the North Carolina public financing system will not begin until
2004, it is unknown at this point whether it will be successful. However, the
evidence on the Wisconsin system suggests that it is severely dysfunctional.
Taxpayer participation in the one dollar check-off system has declined from
twenty percent (20%) in 1979 to less than nine percent (8.7%) in 1998. Consequently, the Wisconsin Election Campaign Fund is deficient in resources necesFor Wisconsin data, see Charles Gardner Geyh, National Summit on Improving Judicial
Selection: Publicly Financed Judicial Elections: An Overview, 34 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1467
47

(2001). For North Carolina data, see Eric Dyer, Lawmakers Approve Bill Altering Judicial
Elections: Nonpartisan Publicly Financed Campaignsfor Appellate Court Posts Could Start
in 2004, GREENSBORO NEWS RECORD, October 2, 2002.
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sary to provide candidates with the maximum $97,031 grant to which they are
entitled. Since 1989, grants to supreme court candidates have generally averaged less than half that amount, about $45,000. Consequently, large numbers
of candidates have simply been opting
out of the program and its concomitant
48
contribution and spending limits.
Not only do many candidates opt out of this poorly funded system, but
Wisconsin's partial funding plan is equally unsuccessful in removing the
appearance of a conflict of interest. Even if judges were to receive the maximum public funding allowed by law, they are allowed to raise an additional
$118,594 from lawyers, interest groups, and others likely to appear in that
judge's courtroom. 49 In other words, even with full funding, candidates opting
into the public financing program will likely acquire over half of their campaign funding needs from the very entities that create the conflicts of interest
the system was designed to avert.
As noted in Table 1, North Carolina hopes to remedy the lack of sufficient
funds in the public financing pool by instituting a dual source of revenue (i.e.,
state income tax check-off and contributions by attorneys) and making the
check-off three times the amount of the program in Wisconsin. The conflict of
interest problem will, ideally, be eliminated by providing full funding for those
candidates that are eligible. However, candidates will be responsible for raising campaign funds for the primary election, albeit in smaller increments than
in the past.
V.

PROSPECTS FOR NEVADA

Nevada has rarely been in the forefront of political reform and it is unrealistic to believe that the state will adopt public financing of judicial campaigns.
As noted above,50 most Nevadans are likely to believe that no problem exists.
And even if they did, the anti-tax and anti-spending political culture of the
Silver State would be unlikely to support such an expensive proposition.
As of June 2002, Nevada had fifty-six (56) district court judges and seven
(7) supreme court justices, totaling sixty-three (63). 5 1 The cost of fully financing races for these sixty-three seats could be large by Nevada standards. For
example, if each of two candidates in each of these races were provided with
$100,000, the total would be over twelve million dollars ($12,600,000) during a
six-year period, or an average of roughly two million dollars per year.
Nevadans, who are quite satisfied to be at the bottom of every list of spending
on social services, health, education, and welfare among the fifty states, and
who are facing lean budgets in the 2003-2005 biennium, are highly unlikely to
divert scarce financial resources to an area that most do not perceive a problem.
Even the $1,400,000 needed to finance seven supreme court seat elections at
48 See Geyh, supra note 29, at 1477.

Id. at 1477-1479. The $118,594 figure is what remains from the mandated spending cap
of $215,625 after the public financing increment of $97,031 is deducted.
49
50

See text accompanying notes 42-43.

51 The Work of Nevada's Courts July 1, 2000 - June 30, 2001, ANNUAL

REPORT OF THE

Fiscal Year 2001-2002, at 6 (available at: http://nvcourtaoc.state.nv.us/
pdf/fy0lannualrpt.pdf) (last visited Aug. 19, 2003).
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$100,000 per candidate (a paltry amount) would likely be considered too
expensive by the state's taxpayers.
Furthermore, due to Nevada's lack of a state income tax, there would not
be an effective way to collect these funds. A check-off system would be
impossible, and simply urging Nevadans to send an annual check to the fund
would be utter failure in a state lacking civic consciousness. Use of general
revenues for this purpose would be highly problematic since this would require
biennial re-appropriation by the legislature. Funding would likely be continually threatened and enmeshed in the politics of every legislative session, thus
making it unstable and unreliable. It might be possible to finance the system
from court fees, but many of these are already committed to worthwhile programs. Those fees are used to finance the operations of the state courts themselves. Raising the licensing fees for attorneys and placing this additional
revenue in the election fund is also a possibility, although it is unlikely to generate anywhere near the amount needed for full funding of these judicial races.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The prognosis for judicial election reform in Nevada is bleak. Voters have
twice indicated that they have no desire to abandon competitive nonpartisan
elections for the noncompetitive retention elections of the merit system. Similarly, voters are unlikely to support public financing of judicial, or any other,
campaigns.
Consequently, it is likely that the state will continue its current path unless
or until a crisis develops that Nevadans perceive to be serious enough to require
remediation. The current path will include a lack of competitiveness in judicial
races, high rates of incumbent reelection, low voter turnout, low levels of information about candidates, and continuing conflicts of interest and perceptions of
conflict of interest in pursuit of campaign contributions.

